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Abstract 
 
Girl, Interrupted is pop-culturally thought of as the poor-woman’s One Flew Over The 
Cuckoo’s Nest. The devaluation of female protagonists, women-centric media and bodily 
emotions form two similarly themed films into separate and distinct realm of artworks. 
Each film takes up specific gendered mental illnesses – Susanna is diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder, seven times more likely in women than men, and 
McMurphy with Anti-Social Personality Disorder, three times more likely in men than 
women. Both diagnoses use gendered rhetoric to categorize the individual’s affects. The 
diagnoses are done through the DSM, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, a tool for categorization and pathologization of behaviours which 
dichotomizes “normal” and “healthy” to “crazy” and “ill”. The films portray the 
naturalizing discourses used to create, diagnose and disseminate these illnesses. Avoiding 
Freudian psychoanalysis and opting for a feminist affect theory based approach, this 
paper will examine the construction and propagation of the normal/ill dichotomy, as well 
as how those narratives flow into other aspects of society such as the Men’s Rights 
Movement and New Age women’s body and health.  
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Toby: Let’s not talk about this anymore 
 
Susanna: Why? 
 
Toby: Because it’s stupid. 
 
 
Girl, Interrupted (1999) is pop-culturally thought of as the poor-woman’s One 
Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest (1975). There are similarities between the narratives: set in 
mental institutions in which there are a variety of illnesses presented in the plentitude of 
B-characters, and purposefully ambiguous levels of “crazy” in the protagonists. Rebellion 
is a major theme within both. Ostensibly, the most significant difference is the gender and 
sex of the characters. Within mainstream cinema, there is a devaluation of female 
protagonists and women-centric media. This paper will argue that this stems from the 
devaluation of emotions themselves through their opposing medicalization and 
naturalization, and their genderization within filmic narratives. The methodological 
approach taken is that of feminist criticism and sexuality studies with a movement 
towards affect theory. Affect theory is a burgeoning academic lens exploring affect, first 
constructed by Deleuze (1966) as the somatic pre-cognitive recognizing of emotion as “a 
force, intensity, or the capacity to move and be moved.” Queer and feminist scholars such 
as Ann Cvetkovich, Sara Ahmed, and Jasbir Puar have taken it up as a radical mode of 
analyzing both psychic and bodily feelings. Stemming from psychoanalysis but having 
moved well beyond, affect theory offers a new approach to studying mental health and 
wellness through non-dualism and breaking down binaries. 
The categories of mental illness and the healthy/ill dichotomy are policed by 
social modes of control such as shame and fear. In One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest, 
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Billy (Brad Dourif) stands up to Nurse Ratched (Louise Fletcher) after being found in bed 
with a woman: 
Nurse Ratched: Aren't you ashamed?  
 
Billy: No, I'm not.  
[Applause from friends]  
 
Nurse Ratched: You know Billy, what worries me is how your mother is going to 
take this.  
 
Billy: Um, um, well, y-y-y-you d-d-d-don't have to t-t-t-tell her, Miss Ratched.  
 
Agency and control, shame and acceptance intertwine differently in each of the films, yet 
they work to form neoliberalist structures of identity. These tools are used in 
medicalizing discourses to pathologize behaviours and affects, creating identity 
categories of ill and healthy. 
Identification with diagnoses is a complex process. Individuals can fight, dismiss, 
excuse, instill, and interpolate their given/forces upon categorical label. Both 
disidentification (Muños, 1999) and identification (or the common negotiation between 
the two) effect the individual’s sense of self, of their identity. Each film takes up specific 
gendered mental illnesses – Susanna, the protagonist of Girl, Interrupted, played by 
Winona Ryder, is diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder, seven times more 
likely in women than men. Jack Nicholson’s R.P. “Mac” McMurphy, One Flew Over The 
Cuckoo’s Nest’s protagonist, has Anti-Social Personality Disorder, three times more 
likely in men than women. Borderline Personality Disorder is described as “a pattern of 
instability in interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity” 
and Anti-Social Personality Disorder is “a pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the 
rights of others” (DSM-IV, 1994). Lisa (Angelina Jolie), Susanna’s friend and villain, 
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like Mac, is a sociopath, which is another term for Anti-Social Personality Disorder. Lisa 
takes pride in her non-gender normative diagnosis, saying: 
Lisa: We are very rare and we are mostly men.  
 
Janet: Lisa thinks she's hot shit cause she's a sociopath.  
 
Both Anti-Social Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorders diagnoses 
use gendered rhetoric in their criteria to categorize the individual’s affects. It is important 
to note the ways in which gender and non-heteronormative sexualities are pathologized 
within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), currently in its 
fifth edition. The DSM is a complete classification of mental disorders that are 
recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. The groups that determine the 
diagnostic categories consist of top researchers in their respective fields and all diagnostic 
categories that are included or revised are done so after a great deal of research. It is 
universally recognized though parts of Europe use a different system. The first DSM was 
published in 1952, the DSM-II in1968, DSM-III 1980, DSM-IV 1994, with the currently 
used DSM-IV-TR (text revision) published in 2000. To point out the dates and few and 
far-between editions is to show the slow-moving pace which may prevent it from staying 
up to date with new research, as well as progressive social movements and the rethinking 
of heteronormative values. Famously, homosexuality was removed as a mental disorder 
from the DSM in 1973. Subsequently, a new diagnosis Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality was 
created. Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality was indicated by “a persistent lack of heterosexual 
arousal, which the patient experienced as interfering with initiation or maintenance of 
wanted heterosexual relationships, and persistent distress from a sustained pattern of 
unwanted homosexual arousal” (UC Davis, Psychology). This was later removed entirely, 
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yet its ghost remains under Sexual Disorders Not Otherwise Specified which include 
persistent and marked distress about one's sexual orientation. Other non-heteronormative 
behaviors were pathologized in the DSM-IV: Sexual Masochism, Sexual Sadism, 
Transvestic Fetishism and Gender Identity Disorder, to name a few extremely 
problematic ones. These categories work to pathologize, demonize, and ‘other’ non-
normative genders and sexualities while reinforcing the ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ dominant 
way of being. Along with being a system of categorization, the DSM and American 
Psychiatrist Association’s categorization is a tool to help psychologists and psychiatrists 
‘correct’. This paper is not a call to invalidate psychology and naturalize mental illness by 
stating it does not exist and neglect the colossal distress of the so-called mentally ill, but 
to examine how specific examples of categorization work to reinforce, strengthen, and 
collect members to the dominant norm.  
Foucault’s Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason 
follows the differing constructions of mental illness in western civilization and the power 
structures that inform labeling and treatment. He states that before the eighteenth century 
the “therapeutics of madness did not function in the hospital, whose chief concern was to 
sever or to ‘correct’” and “it was no longer the presence of the truth that determined the 
cure, but a functional norm” (Foucualt, 1976). Foucault’s work shows the importance of 
the non-permanent hegemonic societal influences of the constructions of mental illness. 
The DSM is portrayed as objective, simply describing what is already in society. In 
actuality, it helps construct, define, and change views and even experiences of mental 
illness. The rhetoric used to describe scientific studies has effects as well. Emily Martin 
(1991) in her paper The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has Constructed Romance 
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Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles examines the ways in which scientific 
language can be used to reinforce stereotypical feminine and masculine cultural 
definitions. She works to “shine a bright light on the gender stereotypes hidden within the 
scientific language.” The field must recognize its own biases, cultural influences and 
epistemological position. Martin (1991) writes:  
One clear feminist challenge is to wake up sleeping metaphors in science...  Although the 
literary convention is to call such metaphors “dead,” they are not so much dead as 
sleeping, hidden within the scientific content of texts - and all the more powerful for it. 
Waking up such metaphors, by becoming aware of when we are projecting cultural 
imagery onto what we study, will improve our ability to investigate and understand 
nature. Waking up such metaphors, by becoming aware of their implications, will rob 
them of their power to naturalize our social conventions about gender.Along with issuing 
a striking feminist call to action, Martin points out the naturalizing discourses used to 
normalize dominant gender conceptions. Mac and Susanna are diagnosed with 
personality disorders: Anti-Social Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality 
Disorder, respectively. The use of the word personality is problematic and troublesome 
for diagnoses; it pathologizes a whole person rather than their behaviours. It implies that 
there is something “wrong,” in need of fixing with an individual’s personality, their 
expression of identity. It lumps individuality into specific categories. This affects the 
patients’ identification with the diagnosis and response to it. Changing a personality is a 
daunting task. In Girl, Interrupted, Susanna and other patients sneak into the 
psychologist’s office to look at their files. For the first time, Susanna sees her diagnosis 
that was kept from her.  
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Susanna: [reading from a book] "Borderline Personality Disorder. An instability 
of self-image, relationships and mood... uncertain about goals, impulsive in 
activities that are self-damaging, such as casual sex."  
 
Lisa: I like that.  
 
Susanna: "Social contrariness and a generally pessimistic attitude are often 
observed." Well that's me. 
  
Lisa: That's everybody.  
 
The rhetoric used has an effect on possible diagnoses. The DSM-IV recognizes this to an 
extent, stating “Antisocial Personality Disorder is much more common in males than in 
females. There has been some concern that Antisocial Personality Disorder may be under 
diagnosed in females, particularly because of the emphasis on aggressive items in the 
definition of Conduct Disorder”(DSM-IV, 1990). The DSM-IV pathologizes gendered 
personality traits, and bases its process of categorization on heteronormativity. What is 
“normal” and “healthy” are specific cultural norms – how men should act, how women 
should act. In fact, one of the criteria for Anti-Social Personality Disorder is a “failure to 
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors”(DSM-IV, 1990). Anti-Social 
Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder, along with many mental 
illnesses, are defined by excess. Mac believes he is diagnosed because he is prone to 
“fight and fuck too much.” It presents fighting and fucking as normative masculine 
behaviours, but taken too far and done too much. It is as though there is an acceptable and 
normal amount of “fighting” and “fucking” allowed for men by society and he has 
crossed that line. Borderline Personality Disorder lists excessive anger as a criterion: 
“inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger”(DSM-IV,1990). The power 
structures within psychology and psychiatry (informed by social norms) are the 
controllers of what is considered “appropriate” emotional reactions. Impulsivity and 
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instability are staples in both disorders as well. Those with Anti-Social Personality 
Disorder are stated that may have a history of many sexual partners and may never have 
sustained a monogamous relationship,” and Borderline Personality Disorder patients have 
are believed to frequently participate in “impulsive,” “reckless,” and “potentially self-
damaging” sex (DSM-IV, 1990). There is a pathologization of non-normative sexual 
behaviours, hierarchizing monogamous and long-term relationships  
Language is extremely important to definitions of mental illness. Jasbir Puar 
states, “the inability to ‘communicate’ functions as the single determinant of mental or 
cognitive impairment (thereby regulating the human/animal distinction), thus 
destabilizing the centrality of the human capacity for thought and cognition” (Puar, 
2012). What is counted as communication is determined by the non-debilitated. There are 
many modes of communication yet only a few are recognized and desired by dominant 
powers. Foucault (1964) has a gloomy view: 
...modern man no longer communicates with the madman ... There is no common 
language: or rather, it no longer exists; the constitution of madness as mental 
illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, bears witness to a rupture in a dialogue, 
gives the separation as already enacted, and expels from the memory all those 
imperfect words, of no fixed syntax, spoken falteringly, in which the exchange 
between madness and reason was carried out. The language of psychiatry, which is 
a monologue by reason about madness, could only have come into existence in 
such a silence. 
 
The supposed lack of language and communication is part of the naturalization of the 
mentally ill. The character of Chief Bromden (Will Sampson) exemplifies the imposed 
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disconnect of communication with the mentally ill; the Chief is considered mute, and no 
one questions it or tries to communicate with him in any way until Mac is 
institutionalized in his hospital. There are other means of communication and information 
transference, yet anything other than linear and logic based verbal communication is 
dismissed as lesser due to its operation in the bodily realm. Mentally ill individuals have 
been viewed in some historical periods as closer to animals than to humans, and currently 
there is a push towards describing the mentally ill as “natural,” closer to nature, and 
closer to their animal selves (what Freud would call an “id”). This discourse works to 
naturalize the mentally ill as “less” than the “healthy” people. In Madness and 
Civilization (1964), Foucault states that in previous eras “madness in its ultimate form is 
man in immediate relation to his animality, without other reference, without any 
recourse.” In the classical period, madness was not seen as an illness; in fact, the 
animality worked as a protection. Now, descriptions of the “rational animal" have 
changed meaning - “the unreason it suggested as the origin of all possible reason has 
entirely disappeared. Henceforth madness must obey the determinism of man perceived 
as a natural being in his very animality” (Foucault 1964). In opposition to animality, the 
ideal person is a “humanized human” (Mitchell, 2003) one who operates purely on reason 
and logic. They are seen as above any bodily functions and only communicate with 
verbal linear language. The mentally ill, however, are seen as “animalized humans,” 
which is described as “the most troubling category of all, since all manner of 
brutalizations carries out by cultural prescription can serve to animalize humans, as can 
reminders of human beings’ mammalian, or even merely bodily, organic existence” 
(Mitchell 2003). There is a devaluing of “naturalness” and a belief that men are creators 
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upon nature and must disassociate aspects of human living.  This disconnect between 
human and animal is wholly constructed through dominant social values. Judith Butler 
(2004) claims that any form of speaking is a bodily act, as it needs the body to perform. 
The depreciation of the animalesque can be seen within the structures of mental 
institutions themselves. They are seen as places outside of society, where young women 
like Susanna who have affairs with their parents’ married friend can be sent to avoid 
scandal, yet also function in the public realm presenting madness as “a thing to look at” 
(Foucualt, 1964). There is an image of animality within the hospitals themselves, 
producing mentally ill patients as  
beasts preyed upon by a natural frenzy: as if madness, at its extreme point, 
freed from that moral unreason in which its most attenuated forms are 
enclosed, managed to rejoin, by a paroxysm of strength, the immediate 
violence of animality. This model of animality prevailed in the asylums and 
gave them their cage-like aspect, their look of the menagerie (Foucault, 1964). 
 
This treatment is seen as acceptable because it creates and continues the dividing 
distinction of human and animal based on the in/ability to linguistically communicate 
with society which stabilizes the importance of humans as defined by capacity of thought, 
cognition, and transference of information.  
One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest employs a discourse of naturalization of 
mental illness so deeply that it seems to present that it does even exist, that the distress 
felt is purely from repression of their sexuality and to a lesser extent their emotions. Mac 
tells the other patients, “What do you think you are, for Chrissake, crazy or somethin’? 
Well you’re not! You’re not! You’re no crazier than the average asshole out walkin’ 
around on the streets and that’s it.” Furthermore, the tagline of the film is “If he’s crazy, 
what does that make you?” To Mac and to the film itself, everyone is “crazy,” and 
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therefore no one is “actually crazy” and in need of treatment. This sort of discourse 
dismisses the very real and harmful states of distress felt by those with mental illness. 
The film also naturalizes problematic gendered behaviours. Mac is arrested for having 
sex with an underage girl, explaining it by saying,  
She was fifteen years old, going on thirty-five, Doc, and she told me she was 
eighteen, she was very willing, I practically had to take to sewing my pants shut. 
Between you and me, uh, she might have been fifteen, but when you get that little 
red beaver right up there in front of you, I don't think it’s crazy at all and I don’t 
think you do either. No man alive could resist that, and that’s why I got into jail to 
begin with. And now they’re telling me I’m crazy over here because I don’t sit 
there like a goddamn vegetable. Don’t make a bit of sense to me. If that’s what 
being crazy is, then I’m senseless, out of it, gone-down-the-road, wacko. But no 
more, no less, that’s it.  
 
The audience is supposed to relate and to accept Mac as normal and mentally healthy, yet 
he excuses statutory rape as a natural male desire. Evidently, Mac is “crazy” because he 
is sexually repressed. He encourages change within the hospital and patients by creating 
stereotypically masculine hobbies. He tries to restore the men’s supposed masculinity 
through gambling, drinking, sex, and fishing, all the while villianizing Nurse Ratched as 
the oppressor of masculinity. Girl, Interrupted naturalizes aspects of mental illness as 
well, but with a more subtle hand. At the end of the film, Susanna is discharged and she 
says in her voice over, “Declared healthy and sent back into the world. My final 
diagnosis: a recovered borderline. What that means, I still don't know. Was I ever crazy? 
Maybe. Or maybe life is.” This dismisses individual experiences and affects by 
propagating the notions that everything and everyone is “crazy.” The dismissal of the 
category of “mentally ill” may seem politically progressive, but it assimilates and 
invalidates personal experiences. The extremely distressing emotions felt are real and 
influential to the outer world. Emotions do things. Rather than seeing them as 
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“psychological dispositions, we need to consider how they work, in concrete and 
particular ways, to mediate the relationship between the psychic and the social, and 
between the individual and the collective” (Ahmed 2004). Affect stimulates reason and 
logic and motivates affective change. “Humanized humans” may be perceived as having 
thoughts and actions distinct from bodily emotions, but they cannot be untied. Behind all 
communication, there is an affect.   
In linearly constructed television and film, cause and effect are necessary for 
intelligibility, and emotions that are not “purposeful” or part of the greater narrative are 
seen as “excessive.” The causes and effects must be understandable in a logic and reason-
based system of action and communication, yet in actuality emotions themselves help 
create and produce all causes and effects. Sara Ahmad challenges the assumption that 
“emotions are a private matter, that they simply belong to individuals, or even that they 
come from within and then move outward toward others. It suggests that emotions are not 
simply ‘within’ or ‘without’ but that they create the very effect of the surfaces or 
boundaries of bodies and worlds” (Ahmed, 2004). Within standard mechanisms of film 
structure, the ‘cause’ is an outside force that changes something for the protagonist. 
Every action must have a cause and effect lest it be labeled as excess, pointless, useless, 
and unnecessary. A piece is considered to be successful, in terms of formal structure, if 
every detail is part of the overarching narrative. Every action of every character must 
make ‘logical sense’ to the viewer; every emotional state the protagonist is in must be 
accounted for. In this system, emotions are only triggered from the outside and then 
consequently felt within. Characters do not simply wake up in a poor mood without it 
meaning something greater or beyond itself.  
HEALTH TOMORROW, VOL. 2 (2014)  13 
 
 
Emotions and affect are essential to identity formation. Ahmad (2004) writes 
“emotions play a crucial role in the ‘surfacing’ of individual and collective bodies 
through the way in which emotions circulate between bodies and signs.” Puar (2012) 
theorizes that there are “diverse switch-points of the activation in the body” that move 
emotions between the self and outside forces in a more back and forth manner. Bodily 
and emotional communication can happen through a sort of osmosis, refuting the cause-
and-effect mode of understanding emotion and action. This means that a feeling is not 
triggered within an individual solely by an outside force; emotions can “start” inside and 
move outwards, and then back in again infinitely. This does not mean that the emotion 
resides exclusively in the individual; it is the “circulation of signs” (Ahmed, 2004) that 
produces affective economies. Behind every cause there is an affect. 
 Collectively, affect can be used to stimulate political change. Ann Cvetkovich 
(2007, 2012) theorizes that there can be a “political depression” which is “the sense that 
customary forms of political response, including direct action and critical analysis, are no 
longer working either to change the world or to make us feel better.” The concept of 
political depression is not meant to be altogether depressing. The aspiration is to 
“depathologize negative affects so that they can be seen as a possible resource for 
political action rather than as its antithesis. This is not, however, to suggest that 
depression is thereby converted into a positive experience; it retains its associations with 
inertia and despair, if not apathy and indifference, but these affects become sites of 
publicity and community formation” (Cvetkovich, 2007). In Girl, Interrupted and One 
Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest, emotions are felt collectively. The patients utilize their 
feelings of repression and frustration and direct them towards mini rebellions. From Mac 
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and his fellow patients taking over the floor for a party to Susanna, Lisa, and friends 
barking at the wife of Susanna’s lover when she publicly lectures her, breaking hospital 
or social rules perform as collective politics acts produced through affect. The goal is not 
to transform, release or “get rid of” their “excessive” emotions but to funnel them into 
political change.  
 Though there are emphases on the power of the collective for feeling and 
transferring emotions and motivating social change, this progressive discourse interacts 
with a neoliberalist approach to mental illness residing solely in individuals. Because of 
the ways in which language is constructed, emotions are seen as individual property. 
They play a role in the “surfacing” of individual and collective bodies through “the way 
in which emotions circulate between bodies and signs. Such an argument clearly 
challenges any assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply belong to 
individuals, or even that they come from within and then move outward toward others. It 
suggests that emotions are not simply “within” or “without” but that they create the very 
effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds” (Ahmed, 2004). Although this 
is the case, neoliberalist notions of agency are dominant and overshadow other modes of 
understanding. In discourses surrounding mental illness, there are damaging concepts put 
forth that construct the distressing feelings as solely residing in the individual, pushing 
self-responsibility.  At present, it is seen that individuals must be constantly working on 
themselves and practicing self-surveillance in order to monitor their in/sanity. Terms like 
“it gets better,” “progress,” and “work at it” perpetuate this myth that mental illness is yet 
another obstacle to overcome in becoming the perfect neoliberal citizen. It proposes that 
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there is a choice between “healthy” and ill. Valerie (Whoopi Goldberg), the head nurse in 
Girl, Interrupted tells Susanna: 
Valerie: You know, I can take a lot of crazy shit from a lot of crazy people. But 
you - you're not crazy.  
 
Susanna: Oh yeah? Then what's wrong with me? What the fuck is going on inside 
my head? Tell me, Dr. Val, what's your diag-nonsense?  
 
Valerie: You are a lazy, self-indulgent, little girl, who is making herself crazy! 
 
Here is Susanna talking to her psychologist, Doctor Wick:  
 
Susanna: I'm ambivalent. In fact that’s my new favorite word.  
 
Dr. Wick: Do you know what that means, ambivalence?  
 
Susanna: I don't care.  
 
Dr. Wick: If it’s your favorite word, I would've thought you would...  
 
Susanna: It means I don’t care. That’s what it means.  
 
Dr. Wick: On the contrary, Susanna. Ambivalence suggests strong feelings... in 
opposition. The prefix, as in “ambidextrous,” means “both.” The rest of it, in 
Latin, means “vigor.” The word suggests that you are torn... between two 
opposing courses of action.  
 
Susanna: Will I stay or will I go?  
 
Dr. Wick: Am I sane... or, am I crazy?  
 
Susanna: Those aren’t courses of action.  
 
Dr. Wick: They can be, dear - for some. 
 
“Craziness” and even emotions themselves are presented as a choice to be made by the 
individual – a choice with one right answer and one wrong answer. The dichotomy of 
“healthy” and mentally ill leaves no middle or in-between space. Susanna cannot be “a 
little crazy” – she either is or she is not, and it is her responsibility to make sure she 
chooses the “right” answer, which is to be “healthy” and “sane.” In One Flew Over The 
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Cuckoo’s Nest, Mac chooses to be labeled as “crazy” in order to avoid going to prison, 
yet is shocked and looks down upon the patients who voluntarily commit themselves and 
take on the negative descriptor. In his naturalizing eyes, “craziness” does not exist and is 
something one chooses for themselves.  
The strict polarization of “healthy” and “ill” helps to regulate social behavioural 
norms in order to profit capitalism. Jasbir Puar (2012) explains that in the United States, 
the number one reason for filing for bankruptcy is due to the cost of medical expenses. 
Mental illness is profitable, but only in the demand to “get better,” “recover,” or 
“overcome”. Lisa addresses this by saying, 
Lisa: That’s what ther-raping is all about. That’s why Freud’s picture is on every 
shrink’s wall. You create a fucking industry. You lie down, you confess your 
secrets and you’re saved. Ca-ching. The more you confess the more they think 
about setting you free.” 
 
Susanna: What if you don’t have a secret 
 
Lisa: Then you’re a lifer like me 
 
This again plays into the ill/healthy dichotomy; if one does not have an illness that can be 
“overcome” by standard health industries and the individual’s affects cannot be 
assimilated into public society, then one is lost. The plentitude of categories in the DSM-
IV do not cover every affective experience and emotional state but if one does not fit into 
the set types, help is hard to find. Citizens are forced to negotiate the capitalist, 
neoliberalist mental health system. Susanna meets a man at a party and tries to convince 
him to stop hitting on her by telling him she is “crazy.” In response, he says: 
Tony: Do you see purple people? My friend, he saw purple people. And so the 
state came and took him away. He didn’t like that. Some time went by and, and he 
told ‘em he didn't see purple people no more.  
 
Susanna: He got better.  
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Tony: Nah, he still sees ‘em.  
 
The prevalence and intensity of the systematic control of public emotion work to 
standardize social norms through the impossible categorization of affect. Naturalizing and 
medicalizing discourses work in different way to pathologize gender and non-
heteronormative sexualities, yet both utilize neoliberalist notions of agency and 
individual responsibility to restrict “excessive” behaviours. The affective force is 
instrumental in the process of action and doing. We must push the notion self-
responsibility for mental health far away from us and look to a more affective and 
effective approach of a collectivity and connectivity – with both other people and the 
duality of body and mind. 
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